AFRICOM: WILL IT SURVIVE THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY AND HOW IT WILL OPERATE IN THE FUTURE?

United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM, is a military structure founded in 2007 with the entire African continent as, to use the military jargon, its “theatre of operations”. The idea behind establishing the Command is hegemonic in nature and interventional in practice. The Command’s mission statement says AFRICOM “counters transitional threats and malign actors” in order to “strengthen security” and respond to threats for the ultimate goal of advancing American “national interests”.

The Command is one of 11 such military structures set up by the US department of Defence and the Pentagon, but it is the only one that is a territory -specific military organisation as its name implies, i.e., Africa. It is also a new approach to foreign policy. While AFRICOM is military in nature and form, it does combine diplomacy, foreign aid and civilian partnerships into its plans to engage with other countries.

The creation of the Command came about after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon itself in Washington. Attempting to prevent and guard against future attacks arising across Africa, the US strategic planners felt the need for the US to have a fully integrated military structure to, specifically, lead its operation across the wider continent.

Ever since its creation over two decades ago, AFRICOM has deployed its combined diplomatic and military capabilities in partnerships with over 40 African nations. In many cases, AFRICOM was engaged in helping humanitarian aid delivery, assisting development at the local level, including drilling water wells, while maintaining its focus on its primary military mission. This year, it brought together military forces from some 20 countries, mainly from African nations, into Phoenix Express 2024 military exercise hosted by Tunisia. AFRICOM said the aim of the exercise is to “enhance cooperation and expertise in maritime security” among the participating countries.

Yet, AFRICOM, and despite being Africa specific, has, so far, failed to find a foothold anywhere on the continent. From its inception back in 2007, South Africa, Algeria and Libya, among others, rejected the idea of allowing AFRICOM to move to Africa, forcing it to stay where it was first established in Stuttgart, Germany. Each country has its own reasons, but they all agree on rejecting the idea of having foreign forces on African soil.

In April 2009, I was among two dozen academics from North Africa invited to participate in an AFRICOM academic workshop organised at its Headquarters in Germany. Delivering his opening remarks, General William Ward, the first Commander of AFRICOM, talked about his recent tour of North African countries which saw him visit Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and concluding in Libya, where he met the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in his tent in Tripoli.

I remember him saying that, when Gaddafi walked into the tent and shook his hand, he asked him, “are you here looking for bases in Africa?” to which the General answered, “No sir. I am just here to listen to leaders” in the region. Mr. Ward went on to say that only then did the Colonel ask him to sit down and, instead of spending half an hour with him, they talked for another hour.

Gaddafi was one of the astonishing African opponents of the presence of any foreign forces on African soil and, until his overthrow and violent murder in 2011, he lobbied other African countries not to allow AFRICOM to have its HQ in Africa. Until today, AFRICOM still operates out of Germany. The late leader was planning a unified African military to help all countries across Africa. On the presence of non-African forces, particularly from superpowers, Gaddafi believed this to be counter to his idea of a unified African military command. However, he and all African leaders welcomed training and other forms of cooperation, within the African Union framework, but without actual physical bases.

Alas, in 2011, AFRICOM played a significant role in the NATO-led military campaign that led to the overthrow of Gaddafi and transformed Libya into an open field for all sorts of foreign military interference and political meddling in its internal and external affairs.

As Russia, China and, to certain a degree Turkiye, make their advances into the African Sahel and deeper into the entire continent, AFRICOM has become more significant to US African policy and worldwide projection of its power. It was not part of the initial mission of the Command to counter other competitive powers as they increase their footprints across Africa, but now it must be. This might pose some structural challenges to the way AFRICOM has been built and the way it has operated, so far.

Recently, AFRICOM suffered a major setback in its African operations when Niger forced the departure of some 1000 US military personnel out of the country and closed two bases, one in Niamey, the capital, while the other in Agadez, close to the Libyan borders in the north—the command centre of drone operations in the region.

Another potential issue that might also hamper AFRICOM’s future plans is Donald Trump’s coming to power. Mr. Trump does not really like Africa which he has never visited while he was president from 2016 to 2020. On top of that, in January, 2018, meeting at the White House discussing immigration Mr. Trump referred to African nations as “shithole countries”, whose refugees the US should not accept.

With the immigration issue topping Trump’s agenda when he takes over on 20 January, it is unlikely that his second administration will positively impact his African policy. During his first presidency, he cut some aid and imposed immigration restrictions on Africans coming to the US.

US investment in Africa is one concern under him. During Biden’s ending presidency, the US invested some $22 billion in different African countries while trying to show that Africa is an important partner. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, allowing eligible African nations to export to the US without taxes, in place since 2000, is likely to end. The policy itself is up for renewal next year and Mr. Trump, championing taxes and levies as a tool to help his “America First” theme, is unlikely to renew it.

Being more of an economic protectionist and anti-government spending on foreign wars, Mr. Trump is not clear when it comes to AFRICOM. It is unlikely, though, he will dismantle it since its new mission now includes countering China’s activities in Africa and Mr. Trump is clearly targeting Beijing’s influences in Africa and beyond, making AFRICOM essential to such policy.

Russia is also a competing power in Africa, both militarily and economically. Over the last few years, Russia has been replacing France in many African countries, particularly in the Sahel area and, lately, in Chad, one of France’s strongest allies in West Africa and the African Sahel. Maintaining AFRICOM might convince Mr. Trump of not only maintaining the Command but widening its “combined” approach to the continent.

What is certain, though, is that AFRICOM HQ will not be welcomed anywhere in Africa. Not just yet, anyway.

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