AS US WATCHES ON, CHINA-SAUDI RELATIONS GROW IN IMPORTANCE

“The dominant ties between China and Saudi Arabia are predicated on commercial activity. However, many global relationships and alliances, bilaterally and multilaterally, began this way and then expanded to other realms, including in the traditional defence areas,” Jonathan Panikoff, the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Program, told Al Jazeera.

A year ago, CNN reported that Beijing supported Saudi Arabia’s indigenous ballistic missile production efforts, which is a case in point. Also, in certain niche areas, such as armed drones, the Chinese have made sales to Saudi Arabia’s weapons development, filling gaps that the US has chosen not to fill for Riyadh.

Washington has grave concerns about the defence and security aspects of the Sino-Saudi relationship. “The challenge for the US, vis-à-vis the China-Saudi relationship, is that Beijing is simply easier to work with from Riyadh’s perspective,” said Panikoff. “It views China as politically consistent, refrains from lecturing Riyadh on issues such as human rights and doesn’t have cumbersome end-user restrictions on military hardware.”

Nonetheless, China is nowhere close to replacing the US as Saudi Arabia’s defence guarantor. There are no indications that Beijing could or would attempt to do so in the foreseeable future.

“China is not really a security partner for the Middle East,” said DesRoches. “In spite of the Chinese expanding their armed forces and the establishment of a base in Djibouti — and I would argue covert bases in [the UAE’s] Jebel Ali, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka — they really don’t have the ability to project force in a decisive and timely manner to defend the integrity of the Saudi state in the way that the US has already done in Operation Desert Storm.”

As Gray put it, “US military assets in the Gulf would help defend Saudi Arabia if its nightmare scenario — a conventional attack from Iran — comes to pass; the first Saudi phone call would be to CENTCOM, not to Beijing.”

At this juncture, there is no reason to expect the Chinese to soon establish any military base on Saudi soil. Yet, that could change many years into the future, according to Panikoff, who posited that “we shouldn’t be as dismissive of that possibility in the coming decades as many seem to be”.

For now, at least, the depth of the Sino-Saudi security partnership should not be overstated. Riyadh, however, appears mostly intent on presenting its defence cooperation with Beijing as much more extensive than it is in reality. This is largely as an effort on Riyadh’s part to gain greater leverage with officials in Washington and remind the Americans that the kingdom has other powerful friends that it can turn to in an increasingly multipolar world.

Reaction from Team Biden

The foreign policy establishment in Washington is not content to see the Saudis so lavishly welcome the Chinese leader to Riyadh. Given the relatively low-key reception that Biden received in Jeddah five months ago, the difference between the American and Chinese presidents’ visits is not lost on US officials.

The White House “would be wise to avoid drawing any more public attention to the visit than it has or will claim”, said Calabrese. “Hyping the ‘China threat’ and/or publicly pressuring Saudi Arabia or any other Gulf country could only prove counterproductive. If there are concrete outcomes to the visit … a more selective approach through quiet diplomacy is likely to be more effective than a blunt-edged public admonition.”