Fri 28 February 2025:
The internal Israeli army probe into Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack acknowledged the military’s “complete failure” to prevent the assault, which killed hundreds of Israelis, a military official said.
“October 7 was a complete failure, the [military] failed in fulfilling its mission to protect Israeli civilians,” the official said, briefing reporters about the report’s contents, on condition of anonymity.
“Too many civilians died that day asking themselves in their hearts or out loud, where was the [Israeli military]?”
“The [military] failed to protect Israeli citizens. The Gaza Division was overrun in the early hours of the war, as terrorists took control and carried out massacres in the communities and roads in the area,” the military said in the summary of the report released to journalists.
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The Israeli army releases investigation into October 7 attack
Here are the key findings of the Israeli army’s probe into the failures that paved the way to the Hamas-led attack, as reported by Israeli media:
- The military misread Hamas’s intentions, believing that the Palestinian group did not pose a significant threat and was not interested in a large-scale war with Israel.
- The army assumed that Israel’s high-tech border fence would have thwarted any threat.
- The Military Intelligence Directorate dismissed information showing Hamas intended to launch a wide-scale attack against Israel over several years as unrealistic.
- The directorate assumed Hamas’s late leader Yahya Sinwar was not seeking a major escalation with Israel.
- The probe assessed that Hamas decided to launch the attack in April 2022. By September the same year, it was at 85 percent readiness and in May 2023 it decided to launch the attack on October 7.
- On the eve of the attack, army’s top officials identified five signs of unusual activity but dismissed the threat of an imminent assault.
- The perception that Hamas did not want war guided decision-makers away from taking action that might have thwarted the attack.
- Military planners had envisioned that, at worst, Hamas could stage a ground invasion from up to eight border points, one military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity in line with regulations, told The Associated Press. In fact, Hamas had more than 60 attack routes.
- Intelligence assessed in the aftermath of the attack has shown Hamas came close to staging the offensive on three earlier occasions, but delayed it for unknown reasons, the official said.
- The Israeli military official said intelligence shows that Yahya Sinwar had begun planning it as early as 2017.
- For the first three hours after the attack, Hamas fighters marauded through border communities and a music festival with little resistance.
- It took hours for the military to regain control and days until the area was fully cleared of fighters.
- According to the first official, the report blamed the military for being overconfident in its knowledge and not showing enough doubt in its core concepts and beliefs.
SOURCE: INDEPENDENT PRESS AND NEWS AGENCIES
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